and biographical, certainly has much to recommend it, since, in our culture, with its two-century-old stress on the authority of demonstrable, historical fact, if we can show that something really happened or was truly said by the person to whom it is attributed, then much else follows. But for our sages of blessed memory, particularly in the two Talmuds, that premise will have presented considerable difficulty. In fact, when we examine how they explained to themselves the reason for attributing sayings to named authorities, we find that each document answers the question in its own way and for its own purpose, and the answers do not harmonize.
What characterizes all writings, however, is a simple fact. We look in vain in the analytical documents for evidence to sustain the stated premise that people really concerned themselves with the issue of who really said what. That is to say, while sayings are attributed, the purpose of the attribution-what is at stake in it, what else we known because we know it-requires analysis in its own terms. Since, as a matter of fact, a saying assigned to one authority in document A will circulate in the name of another in document B, the one-time, determinate assignment of said saying to authority X rather than authority Y cannot be accorded enormous consequence.
If the documents were broadly circulated and
